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ABSTRACT
Marginalizing the “Other” in the Discourse of the
Bush Administration’s War on Terror
by
Sherri H. Christensen
Dr. Thomas R. Burkholder, Examination Committee Chair
Associate Professor o f Communication
University o f Nevada, Las Vegas
In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, al Qaeda-led terrorist attacks. President
George W. Bush and his administration launched a campaign against Iraq in an effort to
oust its leader, Saddam Hussein, and “liberate” the Iraqi people. Despite no credible
evidence o f Iraqi involvement in the 9/11 attacks and the disdain of most o f the global
community, a majority of Americans supported the administration’s desire to attack Iraq.
In an effort to understand the impact o f the Bush Administration’s framing o f the war
on terror on the American public, the “Other,” and the global community as a whole, this
study analyzes four o f President Bush’s public addresses. The resulting critique reveals
that appealing to American exceptionalism, demonizing the enemy, and marginalizing the
“Other” foster an ideology o f dominance and inequality, while fueling tensions between
E ast and W est, reinforcing stereotypes, and resulting in m ore terrorist activity.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION
In the days and months immediately following the September II , 2001, terrorist
attacks in New York and Washington, mucb o f the world came together to grieve with
and support the American people. On September 12, tbe liberal Paris newspaper Le
Monde even proclaimed, “We are all Americans.” ' Despite the horrendous acts of
violence, the international show o f solidarity was uplifting. The Bush Administration
vowed to fight the terrorists, specifically Osama bin Laden, and immediately instituted
changes to ensure that all “terrorists” were kept away from American borders. Wben the
United States learned that bin Laden was in Afghanistan, the U.S. military was deployed
to the Middle East to launch an assault against him and his terrorist network, al Qaeda.
For the most part, these actions were considered justified, as it became apparent soon
after 9/11 that bin Laden was responsible for the attacks. Global goodwill began to wane,
however, when the Bush Administration started issuing directives to Saddam Hussein and
Iraq in 2002— directives that seemingly had nothing to do with bin Laden or tbe 9/11
attacks. Political scientist Tareq Y. Ismael, a noted authority on Iraq, and Jacqueline S.
Ismael posit.

' http://www.worldpress.org/specials/wtc/front.htm
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With Afghanistan effectively brought under US hegemony, Osama bin
Laden was abruptly replaced with another personification o f evil: Saddam
Hussein. The marketing o f Saddam Hussein as a serious threat to
international security was more challenging than the Bush Administration
anticipated. [...] Nevertheless, widespread fears left Americans receptive
to Bush’s claims about Saddam’s possession o f weapons o f mass
destruction (WMD), wbich the media, the Bush Administration, and the
British government, all repeatedly portrayed as an immediate threat to
Western civilization, and indeed, to its very survival. While the American
public bought the Bush Administration’s bill o f goods on the necessity of
war on Iraq, the rest o f the world was unconvinced. (7)
In the ensuing months, the Bush Administration defied the United Nations and
international law, and launched an all-out campaign o f “shock and awe”^ in an effort to
oust Hussein and “liberate” the Iraqi people. The consequences o f what is still going on
in Iraq—the climbing death toll, the U.S. economic drain, the severing of diplomatic ties,
the increase in terrorist activity, and the absolute destruction o f that country, to name just
a few— are sure to be felt for many decades to come.
This thesis will argue that the Bush Administration’s framing o f the war on terror—
appealing to American exceptionalism, demonizing the enemy, and marginalizing the
Other— effectively garnered the support o f the American public and rationalized tbeir
actions in the Middle East. According to GlobeScan and the Program on International

^ “Shock and awe” was a concept introduced by the Bush Administration’s Secretary of
Defense, Donald Rumsfeld. According to Bob Woodward in Plan o f Attack, “ [...] it
meant building up so mucb force and conducting various ‘spiking’ operations and
bombing that it might in itself trigger regime change” (102).
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Policy Attitudes (PIPA), a poll o f 35 countries conducted in the summer o f 2004 revealed
that when “asked how the foreign policy o f President Bush has affected their feelings
toward the US, in 30 countries a majority or plurality said it made them feel ‘worse’
about America

Conversely, the results o f a Harris Poll conducted in June 2003

showed that “a majority of Americans [felt] good about the war, believe[d] that we were
justified in attacking Iraq, and [did] not want to hear, or accept the possibility, that the
reasons for going to war might have been misleading” (Taylor). While support for the
war in Iraq has declined among Americans in recent years, a September 2006 CNN poll
reveals that forty-three percent o f Americans still believe Saddam Hussein was a part of
the 9/11 terrorist attacks, despite the fact that the Bush Administration has admitted he
had nothing to do with them (Poll). Furthermore, a July 2007 New York Times/CBS
News poll shows a slight increase in support for military action in Iraq after “new
warnings from the Bush Administration about heightened terrorist activity” (Thee).
Critics and scholars alike believe the Bush Administration’s controversial decision to
attack Iraq is mired in a neoliberal ideology o f imperialism and hegemony that creates a
dialectical tension between East and West. In Globalization Unmasked: Imperialism in
the I P ' Century, sociologists James Petras and Henry Veltmeyer ask:
Why does Washington have to hide the real economic, political and
military motivations for its interventions behind high moral principles?
Basically, it is because the U.S. is an imperial democracy and moral
rhetoric is used to sway or neutralize domestic public opinion. [...] Like
all imperialist powers, Washington presents its violent interventions as
measures intended to defend ‘national security.’ (139)
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There are a number o f salient reasons to study, analyze, and expose dominant
discourse. Many believe the policies in the Bush Administration’s war on terror are
ethnocentric and unilateralist, and are resulting in greater tensions around the world, an
increase in terrorist activity, and pervasive anti-American sentiment. Additionally, the
administration’s dialectical framing o f the conflict (i.e., good vs. evil, moral vs. immoral,
strong vs. weak) and consequent marginalization o f the Other raise serious ethical
concerns. O f course, American dominance is not a new concept, but globalization creates
a dilemma unlike any we have seen before. In addition to revealing the effects of
dominant discourse, it is my hope that this study may contribute to a growing body of
research and scholarship that seeks to examine and contextualize America’s emerging
role in the global community.

Globalization
We are bombarded daily with images of a multicultural and unified global
community. At the same time, we see examples o f growing anti-American sentiment
around the world, particularly since the start o f the war in Iraq. Globalization, for all its
glitzy appeal, is inextricably linked to inequality, injustice, and power abuse, and the
United States stands as the dominant force in the battle between the developed and
developing worlds. At no other time in history have we been so exposed to the beliefs
and ideas of other cultures, just as they have been exposed to ours. However, despite the
benefits of globalization— access to a plethora o f goods and services, and ease of
international communication and travel, for example— there are undeniable drawbacks to
this phenomenon. “Rapidly, in the span of a few years,” writes Jan Nederveen Pieterse, a
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professor who specializes in global sociology, “globalization has become a focal point of
social criticism, a gathering point of collective discontent— due to financial instability,
economic crisis, global inequality, deepening poverty and social exclusion, job loss,
Americanization, and environmental deterioration” (28). It is alternately described as
imperialistic or “the great equalizer.”
One thing that is certain, however, is that globalization in its current manifestation is
corporate-led. In Jihad vs. McWorld: Terrorism’s Challenge to Democracy,
internationally renowned political theorist Benjamin R. Barber argues, “There is no
activity more intrinsically globalizing than trade, no ideology less interested in nations
than capitalism, no challenge to frontiers more audacious than the market. By many
measures, corporations are today more central players in global affairs than nations” (23).
Multinational corporations and global institutions such as the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) play prominent roles within the context o f corporate
globalization. Corporate globalization, also referred to as neoliberalism, relies on an
autonomous market, diminishing social services, government deregulation, and
privatization. In the quest for free trade, transnational corporations (TNCs) are gaining
power while national sovereignty is being reduced. A predominant criticism o f this
phenomenon is the spreading o f “consumerism” among traditional cultures. Political
journalist William Finnegan writes, “Presented with special force to developing countries
as a formula for economic management, [globalization] is also, in its fullness, a theory of
how the world should be run, under American supervision” (42).
Many critics feel that the current trends in our globalizing world are also resulting in
cultural homogenization, or worse, cultural imperialism, and it is Western, or more
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precisely, Ameriean, culture that is pervading the globe. Barber refers to this as
“McWorld,” a culture that eschews traditional cultural practices while trumpeting a
lifestyle based on consumerism and profit. Many fear the disintegration of culturally
distinct ways and values as the world is inundated with American culture. American fastfood restaurants, television, films, and music saturate once traditional cultures. People all
over the globe are beginning to dress alike, listen to the same music, watch the same
films, and buy the same products. McWorld, as Barber presents it, is a consumer-driven
culture that exists on the mass consumption o f goods and services, while the ideas of
community, culture, and spirituality/religion slowly disintegrate. It is an increasing
awareness o f the Other, just as culture is becoming more homogenous, effectively
negating “otherness.” It is the expansion of free market principles and institutions, and
the simultaneous restriction o f government regulation. It is not, as many believe, a true
democracy. McWorld produces individualism, privatism, and materialism. In essence, as
denizens o f McWorld, we are so integrated in the consumerist culture that our identities
are constructed by the market— products, not our role or place in society, communicate
who we are, what we wear, and even what we think.
Moreover, the events of 9/11 have added a new element for consideration, at least to
Americans: global terrorism. President George W. Bush, in his bid to go after the
terrorists, told the world, “Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make.
Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.”^ According to American
philosopher Richard Rorty, “Disagreement with Washington by foreign governments is
being treated by the Bush White House not as honest difference of opinion but as the

From George W. Bush’s “Address Before a Joint Session o f the Congress on the United
States Response to the Terrorist Attacks o f September 11.” 20 September 2001.
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failure o f knaves and fools to accept guidance from the wise, farsighted, and benevolent”
(23).
At home, Americans opposed to the war have been attacked as ««-American and antidemocratic. For example, after making anti-war comments at a concert in London just
prior to the start o f the war, the Dixie Chicks, an American country music band, were
branded “traitors” and “Saddam’s angels,” among otber things, by many Americans,
including former fans (Segal). According to tbe Chicago Tribune, “radio stations across
the country dropped the Chicks from their playlists after receiving a flood of protests
from irate listeners who did not appreciate the Chicks speaking ill o f Bush” (Chicks
Nicked). It became an ‘either/or’ situation as the patriotism o f those who did not feel the
war was justified was questioned. Surely, such an ultimatum can only serve to divide
further the world. Barber posits, “An America that comprehends the realities of
interdependence and wishes to devise a democratic architecture to contain its global
disorder cannot ask others to either join it or else ‘suffer the consequences.’ [. . .] Rather,
America must join the world on whatever terms it can negotiate on an equal footing with
the world” {Jihad V5. McW orldxxi).
If the purpose o f globalization is to create a global democratic community, then the
President’s message is surely not in line with that directive. Many sectors o f the world are
resisting this current form of globalization, but Barber argues that it is not democracy
they are resisting; it is Westernization, or, McWorld. He believes the U.S. must work
“multilaterally” with other nations to fill the chasm created by tbe hegemonic tendencies
o f corporate globalization. “Yet in the last ten years,” Barber contends, “the United States
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has intensified its commitment to a political culture o f unilateralism and faux autonomy
that reinforces rather than attenuates the effects o f McWorld” {Jihad vs. McWorld xxi).
Democracy is not about individualism, consumption, and materialism. It is about real
communities and the citizens o f those communities, equality, concern for the issues, and
nurturing. Barber writes, “Market relations are simply not a surrogate for social relations,
let alone for democratic social relations [. . .]” {Jihad

McWorld 237). Furthermore, if

democracy represents the will of the people as reflected in the actions o f the government,
then the disintegration o f government so inherent in economic globalization is certainly
««ri-democratic.

Tensions between East and West
The Bush Administration’s actions in Iraq over the past few years have fueled fears of
neocolonialism^ and have further polarized Eastern and Western societies.
Communication scholars Stephen John Hartnett and Laura Ann Stengrim state, “ [...]
President George W. Bush has embarked on a course o f empire-building colonialism,
complete with U.S. armed forces and companies stationed indefinitely in foreign lands—
Afghanistan and Iraq for now, with more likely to come—ruled by governments that [...]
are mere puppets for U.S. power” (10). Additionally, their threats to other non-Western
nations, such as North Korea, Syria, Iran, and Pakistan only confirm— in the minds of

^ Peter Childs and R.J. Patrick Williams, in An Introduction to Postcolonial Theory
(1997), characterize neocolonialism as the modem phenomenon or condition in which the
developed world continues its hegemonic grip on the subaltern. “In the period after
decolonization,” they write, “it rapidly became apparent (to the newly independent
nations, at least) that although colonial armies and bureaucracies might have withdrawn,
Western powers were still intent on maintaining maximum indirect control [. . .] via
political, cultural and above all economic channels [.. .]” (5).
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many— the U.S. desire for global control. According to American historian Richard
Crockatt, “A common thread among virtually all responses from the Middle East and the
Muslim world in general is the profound conviction that the United States has
consistently pursued policies that were against Arab and Muslim interests and in favor of
those o f Israel” (69). These acts o f hegemonism— o f seeking to control and influence
other nations— undermine all peacekeeping efforts and attempts at democratization.
On the surface, U.S. actions and the accompanying rhetoric are framed in terms of
morality and civility, and the pursuit o f a peaeeful, united world. However, the Bush
Administration’s decision to attack Iraq in March o f 2003 has only amplified tensions
between East and West. As President Bush justified his actions in Iraq through his war on
terror speeches, the ways in which he framed each side was evident. Just as Edward Said,
the literary theorist and activist who is regarded as the founding figure in postcolonial
theory, points out in his seminal work. Orientalism, the West (the United States) is
depicted as moral, kind, patient, and civilized, while the East (Iraq) is rendered
dangerous, aggressive, hateful, evil, uncivilized, and completely incapable o f fending for
themselves (300).
These depictions suggest superiority on the part of the West, while relegating the
East to a decidedly inferior status. In An Introduction to Postcolonial Theory, Peter
Childs and R.J. Patrick Williams write, “One o f the most influential aspects o f
Orientalism has been Said’s examination o f the way in which the West not only
constructs the Orient, but constructs it precisely as its Other, the repository of all those
characteristics deemed non-W estem [and therefore negative]” (101). The practice of
Orientalism by Western cultures is the social, cultural, and political construction o f the
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East from a Western viewpoint, not as how it truly exists. According to Childs and
Williams, Orientalism is more dominant now than it was in the past, simply because it is
linked to global politics and policymaking, and because of Eastern portrayals in the
media (101). Orientalism, then, is motivated by the W est’s desire for rationality and need
for explanation. We are drawn by the East’s enigmatic qualities, but fear that which we
do not know or understand.
One o f the predominant criticisms of the Bush Administration has been its defiance of
the United Nations and its unilateralist attack on Iraq. In From 9/11 to Terror War, noted
critical theorist Douglas Kellner writes, “[WJhereas a sane global policy against the
international threat o f terrorism would involve bringing in as many Arab allies and other
countries as possible in the war against Islamic extremism, Bush’s ‘doctrine’ was likely
to alienate both Arabs and allies in the struggle” (213). Alienate it did. Kellner continues,
“Although Bush’s arrogant posturing was playing well domestically, it was faring ever
more poorly in the global arena where it is necessary to gain allies to effectively fight
terrorism” (213). The Bush Administration’s insular and self-absorbed attitude may be its
downfall. In America Alone, Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, both experts in U.S.
foreign policy issues, contend, “The United States now finds itself uncomfortably
isolated within the international community; anti-American feelings have risen quickly;
and the nation confronts an increasingly dangerous and complex security environment.
[...] Under [the Bush Administration’s] influence, America has, sadly, lost legitimacy”
(297).

10
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Focusing on Global Issues in Communication
We are living in a time o f intense change, and the issues o f globalization, culture,
terrorism, hegemony, and democracy have become inextricably linked. The current
trends in globalization play an important role in the war on terror, in the U.S. role in the
global community, and in how the U.S. is perceived by other nation-states. Social and
political theorist Carl Boggs asserts, “The immorality and hypocrisy o f such U.S.engineered catastrophes deserve far more attention than they have received in the media,
the academic world, and the political arena” (3-4). Consequently, it is important to study
the impact o f the Bush Administration’s framing o f the war on terror and o f the Other,
and the implications it had and will continue to have not only on the American public, but
on the global community as a whole.
With the onslaught o f globalization and the supposed interdependence o f the global
community, it is vital that communication scholars look at how leaders and other key
players (including the media) communicate from a broader, more universal perspective.
Indeed, communication plays a large role not only in globalization, but in global
terrorism and the war on terror. In his 1998 address to the International Communication
Association, communication scholar Peter Monge states that “those whose work adopts a
global perspective comprise a small fraction o f communication scholars. Most o f the rest
of us in the communication discipline are just beginning to respond to the global
imperative” (143). Since the publication o f Said’s Orientalism, scholars have been
building on its theoretical underpinnings. In the communication field, according to Raka
Shome and Radha Hegde, “recognizing the postcolonial politics o f communication opens
up new vistas for communication scholarship” (249). While many critics and scholars

11
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have since written about the effects o f 9/11 and the war in Iraq, few have analyzed the
political, cultural, and ethical implications o f dominant discourse from a global
perspective. In “Communication in the Global Community,” Patricia Riley and Peter
Monge write, “The difficult problems and complex transformations in this smaller world
require scholars to question the inevitability o f globalization’s supposed outcomes [...].
Similarly, understanding the role o f communication in the building [and destroying] of
communities in this changing environment is critical” (355). In light o f the events that
have taken place since September II , 2001, the need to focus on global issues in
communication has never been greater.

Chapter Outline
In the aftermath o f the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Bush relied on his public addresses to
unite the American public and justify going to war in Iraq. Although much o f the global
community was outraged by what he had to say, the American public, for the most part,
stood behind him and his administration and supported the decision to go to war. This
study is a close textual analysis o f four o f Bush’s war on terror speeches that illuminates
how framing an issue can affect the way we perceive it.
My analysis draws from two critical approaches— postcolonial theory, which
addresses the relationship between East and West, and critical discourse analysis, which I
use to examine and scrutinize the relationship between discourse and dominant ideology.
In Chapter 2 , 1 describe these approaches as they relate to my study. After introducing the
speeches and explaining their salience. Chapter 3 focuses on a descriptive textual analysis
to reveal thematic elements and key patterns. In Chapter 4 , 1 discuss the implications of

12
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the speeches and the responses from critics, the American public, and the global
community. In addition to explaining the significance from a communication
perspective, I address the global and ethical implications. Chapter 5 serves as my
conclusion.

13
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CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE/METHOD OF ANALYSIS
This study utilizes two critical approaches— postcolonial theory and critical discourse
analysis (CDA). In recent years, postcolonial theory has emerged in the field o f
communication studies as a way to expose dominant discourses and practices. In the
introduction to Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory, Patrick Williams and
Laura Chrisman write, “If one o f the most spectacular events o f the twentieth century was
the dismantling of colonialism, in the shape of the European overseas empires, then one
of the less immediately perceptible— but ultimately more far-reaching in its effects and
implications— has been the continued globalising spread of imperialism” (1). Edward W.
Said’s Orientalism timelessly exemplifies the political and cultural inequalities that
continue despite decolonization, and much o f postcolonial theory is based on his study.
Specifically, I find Said’s treatment o f the conflict between Western and Middle Eastern
ideals exceptionally germane to my study. For example, he writes, “[T]he principal
dogmas o f Orientalism exist in their purest form today in studies o f the Arabs and Islam.
[...] one is the absolute and systematic difference between the West, which is rational,
developed, humane, superior, and the Orient, which is aberrant, undeveloped, inferior”
(300).

14
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Similarly, postcolonial theory is a response to the continued subjugation o f the
“colonized” by the “colonizer;” it seeks to expose discourse that is socially, culturally,
and politically constructed through Western ideals. In “Postcolonial Approaches to
Communication: Charting the Terrain, Engaging the Intersections,” postcolonial scholars
Raka Shome and Radha Hegde offer this definition: “Postcolonial studies, broadly
described, is an interdisciplinary field o f inquiry committed to theorizing the
problematics of colonization and decolonization. As a field it is positioned within the
broader critical project o f cultural studies that has had so much influence in
communication scholarship” (250). Given the nature o f my study, 1 believe postcolonial
theory is one o f the most effective and appropriate lenses through which to view
President Bush’s speeches.
Furthermore, I feel CDA is the most suitable method in which to examine and
scrutinize the relationship between discourse and dominant ideology. Teun A. van Dijk,
editor o f the journal Discourse & Communication, explains that CDA “go[es] beyond
mere description and explanation, and pay[s] more explicit attention to the sociopolitical
and cultural presuppositions and implications of discourse analyses” (Editor 131).
Postcolonial theory and critical discourse analysis are arguably more ideological than
theoretical. They offer a specific way o f viewing dominant discourse, and with that,
consequently, come presuppositions and assumptions. After listening to President Bush’s
war on terror speeches, I deliberately chose postcolonial theory and CDA to expose what
I believe to be hegemonically-constructed rhetoric. Below, I will more thoroughly
explicate these perspectives and establish their relevance to this study.

15
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Postcolonial Theory
Many postcolonial scholars believe the emergence o f corporate globalization has
become the new “colonialism.” Despite claims that this new global community represents
equality, inclusion, and opportunity, hegemonic practices by global powers still exist.
Shome and Hegde write;
The rhetoric o f multiculturalism celebrates the diverse assemblage of
cultures in their pristine flavors— colorful yet standing separate in their
authenticity. [However,] The liberal approach to multiculturalism is
couched in a sanitized version o f difference where the unspoken centers o f
power, and the normativity o f whiteness, remain unquestioned. This
cosmetic approach to multiculturalism does not question the systemic
structures o f power nor does it touch the contradictions and tensions
written into the realities o f everyday life. (262-263)
In reality, the colonial power structure remains, albeit in a much more subtle way, and
the formerly colonized— the Other— are still under the imposing grip o f the elite. Many
issues materialize from a communication standpoint, not the least o f which is the ability
of the West to impose its “messages” on other cultures. Postcolonial theory has thus
emerged within the communication discipline as a response to the indirect subjugation of
the Other by dominant cultures. Shome and Hegde assert, “The driving force of
postcolonial work is to interrogate the universalizing discourse o f Western modernity”
(262). It is used to analyze what postcolonial scholars often refer to as «eocolonial
discourse. In addition, with American/Western influences becoming the dominant global
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cultural paradigm, it is one o f the most effective ways to research these new
“communities,” for it recognizes that hierarchical structures still exist.
Postcolonial theory is seen by its proponents as a system by which cultures,
previously (and, as is the case, currently) mired in Western ideology, can be given a
voice. Scholars do acknowledge that the communication discipline is embedded within
Western thought and practices. Shome and Hegde write, “Taking into account the
historical genealogy of the field, a postcolonial intervention pushes for more socially
responsible problematizations o f communication. It is these critiques that will lead
eventually to the production o f a more just and equitable knowledge base about the third
world, the other, and the ‘rest’ o f the world” (261). In this sense, if postcolonial theory
benefits the “receivers” o f dominant discourse, then many “groups” are affected: culture,
class, race, and gender. Moreover, postcolonial theory benefits those within the Western
culture by exposing the ignorance inherent in “Western representations o f non-Westem
sites” (Kraidy 318), for the Western image o f Otherness has the potential to shape how
we perceive people in other countries. Negative stereotyping o f the Other, for example,
tends to exaggerate ideas o f difference, and reinforces perceptions of cultural and moral
superiority.
Postcolonial scholarship is intrinsically linked to other liberal theories. Shome and
Hegde write, “To a large extent, the critical impulses informing postcolonial studies are
reflected in much o f the left leaning scholarship, including cultural studies, Marxist
theory, feminist theory, postmodern theory, queer theory, and more” (251). In her
posteolonial feminist critique o f National Geographic’s “millennium” issue, postcolonial
scholar Radhika Parameswaran found the same old stereotypes to be prevalent. Her case
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study o f the magazine’s depiction o f globalization reveals a dichotomous relationship that
harkens back to traditional feminine/masculine representations. She writes, “In the binary
oppositional narrative o f East vs. West as spiritual vs. material, the spiritual, conjoined
with fatalism and mute acceptance o f nature was gendered feminine, and the material,
constituted by logic, aggressive questioning o f destiny, and the desire to conquer, was
identified as masculine” (305).
Similarly, international communication scholar Marwan Kraidy finds in his study o f a
series o f articles in the Washington Post entitled “American Popular Culture Abroad,”
that global audiences are depicted as the “submissive female,” while U.S. popular culture
is depicted as the “dominant male.” This goes back to my earlier assertion that Western
discourse remains constructed through dominant ideologies, and while it certainly can be
argued that many Eastern cultures are male-dominant (some going so far as to mistreat
and abuse women and children), it stands to reason that these Western constructions only
reinforce such practices. We cannot ask a people to alter their traditions, yet continue,
albeit in a much more subtle fashion, doing the same.
In her study, Parameswaran questions National Geographic’s depiction o f the nonW estem world, and refers to the “influence” that such media have “on their elite and
largely male audience members, who wield power in the global commercial and political
arenas” (289). Her study is premised upon the following questions:
1. How does the Geographic portray the impact of Western consumer modernity
on non-Westem cultures?
2. What representations o f femininity, masculinity, race, and nation become
alloyed with global culture in the magazine’s arresting photographs?
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3.

What troubling aspects o f globalization does this magazine, which purports to
be an authoritative window on the world, ignore and disavow? (289)

Parameswaran uses textual analysis to answer her questions, and consequently finds that
“postcolonial theories o f representation empower media crities to disrupt and denaturalize
the subtle hegemony of the discursive myths that constitute the logie of globalization”

(289X
Foeusing on the hybridity aspect o f postcolonial theory, Kraidy approaches his text
using Derridean deconstruction. His findings reveal two distinct meanings within the
P o st’s discourse: the explicit message in which hybridity is portrayed as “enlightened
diversity,” and another less obvious, implicit representation o f “eultural hegemony”
(325). Ultimately, Kraidy asserts, “hybridity is appropriated in an attempt to fix the
meanings constructed by global audiences in their reception o f U.S. popular culture”
(331). For example, Hollywood exeeutives justify the lack o f minority actors in American
films by stating that foreign audiences are not interested in “ethnic” or “female” movies.
In doing so, they transfer blame to the global (submissive) audience. Whether explicit or
implicit, U.S. culture emerges as the dominant construct.
Like feminist and Marxist theory, postcolonial theory is not based on a hierarchical
construct, but rather a fluid dynamic; consequently, it does not rely on any one method.
“Because its questions emerge from larger social contexts, its method is therefore shaped
by the questions posed by the contexts,” Shome and Hegde explain (258). However, they
emphasize the importance o f methodologieal reflexivity: “While working within a eertain
philosophieal or methodological tradition [be it deconstruction or ethnography],
postcolonial scholars remain acutely aware o f the history, heritage, and legacies o f such
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methods, and the dilemma that consequently confronts the researcher” (259). In addition,
representation o f the Other should take into account cultural and historical differences—
partieipants should not all be “lumped” together as the oppressed or the Other, for this
only reiterates a power structure the postcolonial theorist is trying to avoid. Identity,
particularly cultural and political identity, is paramount to the creation o f a more equal
multicultural society.
Critiques o f Postcolonial Theory
Despite the recent popularity o f postcolonial scholarship, it does have its critics.
Communication scholar Anandam Kavoori argues that “postcolonial theory [ . ..] ignores
the politics of its own placement in western academe and its singular ties to the workings
o f global capitalism” (196). He sees a disjuncture in the term “post-colonial” and the
issues o f imperialism and hegemony it seeks to expose. How can post-colonial theory
reveal the problematie effects o f colonial discourse? More importantly, how can Western
scholars utilize a theory that seeks to discredit the discourse o f a culture to which they
belong? Shome’s response^ is rather terse:
[. ..] isn’t that the very predicament o f the postcolonial subject position?
That the ‘knowledge structure’ in which many post-colonial intellectuals
are/were trained was itself an effect o f colonialism to which they were and
are ‘subject’? Indeed, isn’t the very predicament o f the ‘postcoloniaT
position that we have [or had] little choice in this matter as we are
‘subject’ to colonial intellectual domination in ‘other w orlds’ as

^ Shome’s article, “Caught in the Term ‘Post-ColoniaT: Why the ‘Post-Colonial Still
Matters,” is a response to Kavoori’s criticism o f the term “post-colonial” in “Getting Past
the Latest ‘Post’: Assessing the Term ‘Post-Colonial.” Both articles can be found in
Critical Studies in Mass Communication 15 (1998).
20

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

‘knowledges’ from the ‘W est’ travel through global circuits o f power and
limit [and in some cases wipe out] the means for producing ‘indigenous’
knowledge? (209)
To illustrate her point, Shome refers to feminist theory, arguing that Kavoori’s “logic”
would require that feminist theorists not use feminist theory if they were trained in maledominant Western academia.
Ella Shohat, an expert in Middle Eastern studies and another outspoken critic of
postcolonial studies, posits, “The term post-colonial carries with it the implication that
colonialism is now a matter o f the past, undermining colonialism’s economic, political,
and cultural deformative-traces in the present. The ‘post-colonial’ inadvertently glosses
over the fact that global hegemony, even in the post-cold war era, persists in forms other
than overt colonial rule” (326). Shome counters that “post” represents the phase (or,
perhaps, space or time), whereas neocolonial or colonial represents the condition: “[Post
colonial] is a project that attempts to examine various colonial relations that mark and
emerged (albeit unevenly) in various post-colonial spaces” (207).
Shome and Hegde write, “The postcolonial approach to question, reframe, and rethink
epistemic assumptions is inspired by the spirit o f resistant enquiry, the drive to return the
colonialist gaze” (264). In my view, postcolonial theory is a valid and important part of
communication studies as it offers an alternative perspective while dismantling and
exposing dominant discourse. Despite eritics’ claims that “postcolonial” undermines the
very essenee o f the colonial experience (by insinuating that colonialism is no longer
practiced), I believe it is imperative that scholars look at dominant discourse through a
lens unclouded by eultural assumptions and judgments.
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Critical Discourse Analysis
Like postcolonial theory, CDA challenges the inequalities and abuses o f power
inherent in dominant ideology. Its primary focus is social and political issues, and it
ultimately hopes to effeet change through a critical understanding o f the relationship
between dominance and discourse. According to van Dijk, CDA centers on ‘"the role o f
discourse in the [re]production and challenge o f dominance. Dominance is defined here
as the exercise o f soeial power by elites, institutions or groups, that results in soeial
inequality, [...]” (Principles 249-250). In that respect, CDA focuses on “top-down
relations o f dominance”— meaning it looks not so much at the persuaded as it does the
persuader. “ [0]ur critical approach prefers to focus on the elites and their discursive
strategies for the maintenance o f inequality,” writes van Dijk (Principles 250).
CDA also focuses on the power strategies used to justify and legitimate dominant
actions. According to van Dijk, “ ‘modem ’ and often more effective power is mostly
cognitive, and enacted by persuasion, dissimulation or manipulation, among other
stratégie ways to change the mind o f others in o n e ’s own interests" (Principles 254). In
the Bush Administration’s war on terror, for instance, fear and morality are used to
manipulate and persuade American audiences to support U.S. actions in Iraq, van Dijk
writes, “One major function o f dominant discourse is precisely to manufacture such
consensus, acceptanee and legitimacy o f dominance” (Principles 255). Consequently,
CDA is eoncerned with power abuse, and the moral and ethical implications o f such.
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In “Discourse and Manipulation,” van Dijk applies CDA to a speech by British Prime
Minister Tony Blair regarding the war in Iraq to illustrate the use o f manipulation.^ He
finds that “the most influential form o f manipulation does not focus on the creation of
specific preferred mental models, but on more general and abstract beliefs such as
knowledge, attitudes and ideologies” (368). Once the intended target has been influenced,
“little or no further manipulation attempts may be necessary in order for people to act
according to these attitudes” (369). This can be especially true in the face o f certain
events, such as the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, by playing on fears
and insecurities. Van Dijk feels that ‘victims’ o f manipulation generally encompass
certain fundamental values, an “incomplete or lack o f relevant knowledge,” vulnerability
in the face of tragedy, and “social positions, professions, status, etc. that induce people
into tending to accept the discourses, arguments, etc. o f elite persons, groups or
organizations” (375).
In the case o f Blair’s speech to members o f the British parliament, van Dijk argues
that while “ [they] are not exactly stupid people,” they are “less powerful than the
government [Blair and his administration]” (379). Consequently, “Blair defines the
situation in such a way that few MPs can refuse, even when they know they are being
manipulated and probably lied to” (380).
Intercultural communication scholar Tatyana S. Thweatt uses CDA to investigate the
representation o f immigrants and refugees in a series o f articles and editorials from the
local newspaper in a predominantly white community. Through her analysis, she finds

For the purposes o f his study, van Dijk defines manipulation as “a communicative and
interactional practice, in which a manipulator exercises control over other people, usually
against their will or against their best interests.” For example, “politicians or the media
manipulating voters or readers, that is, through some kind o f discursive influence” (360).
23

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

that news stories regarding immigrants and refugees are almost always negative, thereby
contributing to the reproduction of racism and stereotyping. Specifically, the use o f
metaphors [i.e., the “flood” metaphors: “Refugees were repeatedly said to come in waves,
they flooded and even invaded the community”— Thweatt argues that these negative
connotations “dehumanize” the refugees (34)], euphemisms, and semantic contrast
emphasize the positive aspects o f the members o f the community, while negatively
portraying Otherness. In one such case, “the burning o f an ethnic restaurant [presumably
by a member of the dominant group] was called an ‘unfortunate incident’” (35), while
social problems and other complications within the immigrant/refugee population were
emphasized. Thweatt’s analysis demonstrates how the media reproduces the “ideology of
white dominance [i.e. ideology o f consensus] by creating the ideological context that
promotes stereotypes o f inferiority and exclusion [...]” (40).
Categories o f Analvsis
CDA is multidisciplinary; therefore, methodological approaches are diverse. From a
communication standpoint, and for the purposes o f this study, a qualitative textual
analysis o f both discursive and cognitive structures and the use o f language might reveal
intended meanings. In “The Reality o f Racism,” van Dijk lists potential categories of
analysis:
•

Actor Description. Van Dijk points out that “the overall ideological strategy is that of
positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation” (214). This is one o f the
most critical and relevant aspects o f CDA as it relates to my proposed study. “Models
are being expressed and persuasively conveyed that contrast US with THEM, e.g. by
emphasizing ‘our’ tolerance, help or sympathy, and by focusing on negative social or
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cultural differences, deviance or threats attributed to ‘them’,” writes van Dijk
(Principles 263). This practice, prevalent during colonization, is also characteristic o f
modem corporate globalization and the resulting power stmctures, as well as the
rhetoric of the war on terror.
•

Authority. In this strategy, speakers refer to experts, moral leaders, and other authority
figures to lend credence to their discourse (215).

•

Consensus. In this political strategy, discourse implicitly states that WE must stand
together. “ [Ijngroup unification, cohesion and solidarity [WE against THEM], should
prevail over party politics and division” (216). This is particularly relevant to the
Bush Administration’s rhetoric, considering Americans are deeply divided on the war
in Iraq.

•

Example/Illustration. Van Dijk writes, “A powerful move in argumentation is to give
concrete examples, often in the form o f a vignette or short story, illustrating or
making more plausible a general point defended by the speaker” (218).

•

Fallacies. According to van Dijk, “These may pertain to any element o f the
argumentative event, namely to the nature o f the premises, the relations among the
premises and the conclusion, the relations between speaker and recipients, and so on”

218 ).
•

Implication. Meanings and messages are implied when explicit statements “could be
interpreted as biased or racist” (220). In addition, vague meanings are used to deemphasize those elements the dominant group wishes to keep from recipients.

•

Lexicalization. In this strategy, the speaker uses different words with similar
meanings to express a particular point o f view or opinion (220). For example.
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replacing “racism” with “xenophobia,” or “poverty” with “destitution” gives the
discourse more gravity or formality.
•

National Self-Glorification. This is another method o f positive self-presentation.

•

Polarization. This is the WE vs. THEM categorization.

•

Populism. In this strategy, the speaker claims the people— “everybody”— support or
do not support a particular idea (223); this method is much like the bandwagon
fallacy.

•

Victimization. “[W]hen the Others tend to be represented in negative terms, and
especially when they are associated with threats, then the ingroup needs to be
represented as a victim o f such a threat” (224). 9/11 is often used to present America
as the “victim.”

In Elite Discourse and Racism, van Dijk describes two more strategies;
•

For Their Own Good. In this argument, which van Dijk refers to as “paternalistic,”
the dominant group is engaging in something that is in the best interests o f the Other.
“This Apparent Empathy or Apparent Altruism move is again a functional part o f the
overall strategy of positive self-representation: We are doing something good for
Them” (95).

•

The Numbers Game. In this strategy, figures are used to present information in the
most persuasive manner. “This rhetorical use o f quasi-objective figures, [...] is one of
the most compelling scare tactics in the formation o f public opinion” (107).

Finally, van Dijk refers to a very relevant (in terms o f this study) discourse strategy in his
article “Discourse and Manipulation” :
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•

Generalization. This is a strategy “in which case a concrete specific example that has
made an impact on people’s mental models is generalized to more general knowledge
or attitudes, or even fundamental ideologies” (370). For example, the Bush
Administration uses the tragedy o f 9/11 to make general statements regarding
terrorism and the war on terror.
As van Dijk points out, critical discourse analysis “must in turn be embedded in a

broader social, political or cultural theory o f the situations, contexts, institutions, groups
and overall power relations that enable or result from such ‘symbolic’ structures”
(Principles 259). In this sense, postcolonial theory can be used to establish the context
and the implications o f the discourse.
The aim o f CDA is much like that o f postcolonial theory— it seeks to analyze,
understand, and expose the inequities inherent in dominant discourse and ideology, van
Dijk states, “ [Critical discourse analysts’] hope, if illusory, is change through critical
understanding. Their perspective, if possible, that o f those who suffer most from
dominance and inequality. Their critical targets are the power elites that enact, sustain,
legitimate, condone or ignore social inequality and injustice” (Principles 252).
CDA not only analyzes the ways in which dominant groups attack, discredit, and
marginalize other groups, it also looks at the means by which they are able to manipulate
public opinion. In the rhetoric regarding the war on terror, for example. President Bush
uses his role as the leader of our country to have a “one-sided” conversation with the
American public; we are aware o f the situation based solely on his interpretation and
discourse. According to van Dijk, “Such processes o f persuasion involve not only
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persuasive argumentation and rhetoric, or congenial opinions, but also the authority with
which the politicians and the media are able to present such models” (Principles 268).
van Dijk recognizes the limitations o f CDA. He writes, “ [It] does not yet provide
solutions to problems or strategies to fight inequality. [...] Without a thoroughly founded
criticism o f those authorities or institutions who are responsible for the inequalities, we
are no more than ‘free-floating intellectuals’” (Handbook 7). It does, however, “ [provide]
us with rather powerful, while subtle and precise, insights to pinpoint the everyday
manifestations and displays o f social problems in communication and interaction”
(Handbook 7).
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CHAPTER 3

TEXTUAL ANALYSIS
In the aftermath of the September II , 2001, terrorist attacks, the Bush Administration
faced an unusual situation. In his public addresses. President George W. Bush not only
had to comfort and reassure the nation, he had to define the enemy and what came to be
known as the “war on terror.” Perhaps more than any other time in history, the world
was listening. In Plan o f Attack, political journalist and Washington Post reporter Bob
Woodward writes, “Roughly two-thirds o f the American people thought Bush was a
strong leader. They might disapprove o f his performance as president, disagree with his
policies or not like him, but a strong leader could generally prevail with his agenda if he
stood up and pushed for it— in other words played politics” (91). In addition, due to the
intense media coverage following the terrorist attacks, Americans were gripped with fear
and a distrust o f foreigners, particularly those o f Arab descent. The conditions were
optimal for a captive audience.
For this study, I have chosen four public addresses that represent the most crucial
time in terms of gaining support from the American public as well as from a global
audience. To illustrate the issues o f dominance and marginalization, I have analyzed the
following speeches:
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Address Before a Joint Session o f the Congress on the State o f the Union, January 29,
2002. Although Bush’s address to the nation on September 20, 2001 marked the
beginning o f his war on terror speeches, it was not until his 2002 State o f the Union
address that he outlined the “Iraqi threat.” This speech— also known as the “Axis of
Evil” speech in which North Korea’ , Iran, and Iraq are labeled as threats to the “peace
of the world”— focuses on bringing Americans together, while polarizing US and
THEM. Additionally, Bush defines the “enemy,” and sets the stage for military action
outside Afghanistan; “Our war on terror is well begun, but it is only begun. This
campaign may not be finished on our watch— yet it must be and it will be waged on
our watch” (135). At this time, Americans, for the most part, supported the war in
Afghanistan, but talk o f war in Iraq was beginning to create a rift. With public
support for the Bush Administration at “historic levels” (Online NewsHour), this
speech gave Bush the opportunity to bolster support for his plans in the Middle East.
Address to the Nation on Iraq from Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002. After his 2002
State of the Union address. Bush’s subsequent public addresses became part o f a
“campaign” in which he sought support for his Iraq policies. This speech was given
on the eve of the congressional vote to authorize use o f force against Iraq. The
following morning, Washington

journalist Karen De Young wrote, “Bush spoke

in a televised speech aides said was scheduled so that he could explain his Iraqi
policy directly to the American people. Although it seems likely that the resolution
Bush seeks will pass both houses o f Congress by the end o f the week, polls show that

’ Zbigniew Brzezinski, author o f The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership,
writes, “The inclusion o f North Korea in the ‘axis of evil’ was widely interpreted as a
deliberate effort to obscure the narrower, one-sided American preoccupation with
proliferation specifically in the Middle Eastern region” (32).
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public support is waning. Most Americans still support war against Iraq but have
questions about its timing and the lack o f support from allies” (A l). In this speech,
Bush is very candid as he seeks to justify what he perceives to be the “Iraqi threat.”
Address to the Nation on Iraq from the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln, May I, 2003. In this
speech, which is also referred to as the “End o f Combat” speech. Bush announces
from the deck o f the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln, an aircraft carrier returning from the
Middle East, that major combat operations have ended in Iraq. This speech is
particularly salient for its context— Bush landing on the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln via
military jet and clad in a flight suit plays out like a Hollywood production. Senator
Robert C. Byrd, in a response to the President’s speech, writes, “As I watched the
President’s fighter jet swoop down onto the deck o f the aircraft carrier Abraham
Lincoln, I could not help but contrast the reported simple dignity o f President Lincoln
at Gettysburg with the flamboyant showmanship o f President Bush aboard the USS
Abraham Lincoln” (par. 2). However, this speech follows a war whose massive
television coverage allowed us to see the destruction and devastating loss of life. In
this sense, the speech serves to justify the actions in Iraq while it establishes the
strength and might o f the United States.
Address to the Nation on the War on Terror, September 7, 2003. In the months
following the “end o f combat in Iraq,” it became quite clear to the American people
that the war was not over. In this speech. Bush urges Americans to be patient: “This
will take time and require sacrifice. Yet we will do what is necessary, we will spend
what is necessary, to achieve this essential victory in the war on terror, to promote
freedom and to make our own nation more secure” (1164). In addition, he emphasizes
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u s vs. THEM and GOOD vs. EVIL to engage the continued support o f the American
public.
Together, these speeches define the “war on terror,” appeal to American
exceptionalism, and create dialectical tensions that serve to demonize and marginalize the
Other.

Thematic Elements and Key Patterns
Through my examination o f these speeches, I found that many o f Teun van D ijk’s
categories o f analysis are applicable. For example, all o f the speeches are polarizing—
pitting US (America) against THEM (Iraq/Muslims). O f course, the United States is
portrayed as moral, civilized, strong, and helpful, while they are rendered evil,
aggressive, uncivilized, and weak or helpless. According to van Dijk, “If such ‘polarized’
models are consistent with negative attitudes or ideologies, they may be used to sustain
existing attitudes or form new negative attitudes. One o f the strategic ways to make sure
that such generalizations are made is to emphasize that the current model is ‘typical’ and
not incidental or exceptional, and that the negative actions of the Others cannot be
explained or excused” (Principles 263-64).
Bush frequently cites the events o f September 11, 2001, in his speeches. He does this
by utilizing two rhetorieal strategies. On the one hand, he uses the tragedy o f 9/11 to
make generalized statements about the war on terror and Iraq. In doing so, he implies an
association between the terrorist attaeks and Saddam Hussein. For example, “The battle
o f Iraq is one victory in a war on terror that began on September the 11'^, 2001, and still
goes on. That terrible morning, 19 evil men, the shock troops o f a hateful ideology, gave
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America and the civilized world a glimpse o f their ambitions” (5/1/2003, 517).
Furthermore, in his Cincinnati address he says, “The attacks o f September the 11*'^
showed our eountry that vast oceans no longer proteet us from danger. Before that tragic
date, we had only hints o f Al Qaida’s [sic] plans and designs. Today in Iraq, we see a
threat whose outlines are far more clearly defined and whose consequences could be far
more deadly. Saddam Hussein’s actions have put us on notice, and there is no refuge
from our responsibilities” (1720). A close reading o f these paragraphs reveals that Bush
does not directly link Saddam Hussein and 9/11; however, most audienee members will
hear these sentences spoken together and assume a conneetion.
The other strategy involves presenting the United States and Amerieans as vietims.
As van Dijk points out in “The Reality o f Raeism,” when the Other is presented as a
threat, “then the ingroup needs to be represented as a victim o f such a threat” (224).
Using such a tragedy to make general statements regarding the war on terror and
presenting the U.S. as the victim both serve to justify going to war in Iraq and are
certainly meant to play on the emotions o f the American public, but as Senator Robert C.
Byrd points out in his response to the president’s May 1, 2003 “End o f Combat” speech,
“It may make for grand theater to describe Saddam Hussein as an ally o f al Qaeda or to
characterize the fall o f Baghdad as a victory in the war on terror, but stirring rhetoric does
not necessarily reflect sobering reality. Not one o f the 19 [...] hijackers was an Iraqi. In
fact, there is not one shred of evidence to link the September 11 attack on the [U.S.] to
Iraq” (par. 5).
Another strategy that Bush often employs is to give examples or tell personal stories
to illustrate a point or create a more forceful impact on his audience. For example, in his
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2002 State o f the Union Address, Bush says, “For many Americans, these 4 months have
brought sorrow and pain that will never completely go away. Every day a retired
firefighter returns to Ground Zero to feel closer to his two sons who died there. At a
memorial in New York, a little boy left his football with a note for his lost father: ‘Dear
Daddy, please take this to heaven. I don’t want to play football until I can play with you
again some day’ ” (134). These vignettes not only play on the theme of “victim” by
referring to the horrific effects o f 9/11, they evoke images that would tug at the heart of
the most cynical American.
Similarly, Bush often refers to authority figures to lend credence to his assertions and
to demonstrate cohesiveness. For instance, in his Cincinnati address, he refers to a former
chief weapons inspector to bolster his allegations that Saddam Hussein possessed
weapons o f mass destruction (1716-17). Additionally, in the same speech he implores,
“America must not ignore the threat gathering against us,” and quotes President John F.
Kennedy (1718). A bit later he says, “ [T]wo administrations, mine and President
Clinton’s, have stated that regime change in Iraq is the only certain means of removing a
great danger to our Nation” (1719). Not only does he reference two very popular
presidents, he references two Democratic presidents. The inference is one o f consensus
among Republicans and Democrats, and serves to appease those who may not support the
idea of going to war in Iraq.
In the 2003 preface to his book Orientalism, Edward W. Said writes, “Reflection,
debate, rational argument, moral principle based on a secular notion that human beings
must create their own history have been replaced by abstract ideas that celebrate
American or Western exceptionalism, denigrate the relevance o f context, and regard
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other cultures with derisive contempt” (xxvii). A thorough analysis o f the four speeches
reveals a pattern used by Bush that justifies the war in Iraq primarily through positive
self-presentation and negative other-presentation. While many o f van Dijk’s categories of
analysis are utilized, these war on terror speeches exemplify three distinct themes:
American exceptionalism, demonization o f Iraq/Muslims, and marginalization o f the
Other.
American Exceptionalism
Under the premise o f American exceptionalism, the strength, morality, and civility o f
the United States and its citizens are emphasized. For example, when Bush announces
that major combat operations have ended in his May 1, 2003 speech, he legitimates the
U.S. action in Iraq by using such phrases as “noble cause” (516), “great moral advance”
(516), and “patient justice” (517). He further justifies the war: “In these 19 months that
changed the world, our actions have been focused and deliberate and proportionate to the
offense” (517), and “American values and American interests lead in the same direction:
We stand for human liberty” (517). And in his 2002 State o f the Union address, he says,
“America will lead by defending liberty and justice because they are right and true and
unchanging for all people everywhere” (138). The implication here is that we know what
is best for all people.
Bush refers to the “civilized world” throughout all four speeches; in his September 7,
2003 address, he asserts, “Terrorists in Iraq have attacked representatives o f the civilized
world, and opposing them must be the cause o f the civilized world” (1165). O f course,
the implication is that Iraq and the Middle East in general are “uneivilized.” As such.
Bush draws largely upon positive self-presentation and national self-glorification, and he
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does so by presenting America as “the chosen,” by stressing that good— “we”— will
prevail, and by utilizing consensus and populism to create a sense o f solidarity.
A dominant theme in all o f Bush’s discourse is that America and its citizens have
been “chosen;” it is as if we have been given the responsibility to rid the world o f terror
and “democratize” all nations. For example, in his 2002 State of the Union address, he
asserts, “History has called America and our allies to action, and it is both our
responsibility and our privilege to fight freedom’s fight” (135). In the same speech, he
insists that because we have been given this responsibility, we must act accordingly. He
depicts Americans as unique, as having a duty or job to do. To lend even more gravity, he
invokes God and history:
Beyond all differences o f race or creed, we are one country, mourning
together and facing danger together. Deep in the American character, there
is honor, and it is stronger than cynicism. And many have discovered
again that even in tragedy— especially in tragedy— God is near.
In a single instant, we realized that this will be a decisive decade in the
history o f liberty, that w e’ve been called to a unique role in human events.
Rarely has the world faced a choice more elear or consequential. (138-39)
In his Cincinnati speech, in which he feels the need to bolster support among average
Americans, he continues his theme o f “the chosen” while also creating a sense o f unity—
a sense that we are all in this together. “We did not ask for this present challenge, but we
accept it. Like other generations o f Americans, we will meet the responsibility of
defending human liberty against violence and aggression. By our resolve, we will give
strength to others. By our courage, we will give hope to others. And by our actions, we
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will secure the peace and lead the world to a better day” (1720). He closes his September
7, 2003, speech with: “Fellow citizens: W e’ve been tested these past 24 months, and the
dangers have not passed. Yet Americans are responding with courage and confidence.
We accept the duties o f our generation. We are active and resolute in our own defense.
We are serving in freedom’s cause— and that is the cause of all mankind” (1166).
In addition to giving Americans a special status. Bush often avows that good (“we”)
will overcome evil, in essence asserting that “we” will win the war. For example, “Our
enemies believed America was weak and materialistic, that we would splinter in fear and
selfishness. They were as wrong as they are evil. The American people have responded
magnificently, with courage and compassion, strength and resolve” (1/29/2002, 137). He
also states, “Through the gathering momentum o f millions o f acts o f service and decency
and kindness, I know we can overcome evil with greater good” (1/29/2002, 138). In his
October 7, 2002 speech, the need for stronger language is obvious: “And through its
inaction, the United States would resign itself to a future of fear. That is not the America
I know. That is not the America I serve. We refuse to live in fear. This nation, in World
War and in cold war, has never permitted the brutal and lawless to set history’s course.
Now as before, we will secure our Nation, protect our freedom, and help others to find
freedom o f their own” (1720).
Despite widespread support from Americans, Bush faced skepticism and opposition
both at home and abroad regarding action in Iraq. Therefore, uniting Americans and
creating a sense o f solidarity was vital. Regarding the congressional vote to authorize the
use of military force, he says, “The resolution will tell the United Nations and all nations
that America speaks with one voice and is determined to make the demands o f the
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civilized world mean something” (10/7/2002, 1720). It was also important that he blur
party lines. During his 2002 State of the Union address, he says:
September the 11*'’ brought out the best in America and the best in this
Congress. And I join the American people in applauding your unity and
resolve. Now Americans deserve to have this same spirit directed toward
addressing problems here at home. I ’m a proud member o f my party. Yet
as we act to win the war, protect our people, and create jobs in America,
we must act, first and foremost, not as Republicans, not as Democrats but
as Americans. (135-36)
Building on the theme o f “the chosen,” Bush attempts to make Americans feel as if
we have an important role in the war on terror. This, in turn, adds to the sense that
Americans are unified. For example, in his “Axis o f Evil” speech, he says, “And as
government works to better secure our homeland, Ameriea will continue to depend on the
eyes and ears o f alert citizens” (136). He follows this statement with an illustration o f the
flight crew and passengers who subdued an Al Qaeda operative who was armed with
explosives. In telling this story, ordinary Americans become heroes. It also instills a sense
of fear, a sense that what happened on September 11, 2001 could happen again. Later in
the same speech, he emphasizes once again that we have a role: “None o f us would ever
wish the evil that was done on September the 11‘^. Yet, after America was attacked, it
was as if our entire country looked into a mirror and saw our better selves. We were
reminded that we are citizens with obligations to each other, to our country, and to
history. We began to think less o f the goods we can accumulate and more about the good
we can do” (137) (emphasis added).
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Demonization o f the Enemy
In his war on terror speeches, Bush creates a vivid portrait o f the enemy. He
accomplishes this predominantly through negative other-presentation, and also through
fostering a climate o f fear. In his 2002 State of the Union address. Bush sets the stage by
stating: “What we have found in Afghanistan confirms that, far from ending there, our
war against terror is only beginning. [...] Thousands o f dangerous killers, schooled in the
methods of murder, often supported by outlaw regimes, are now spread throughout the
world like ticking timebombs, set to go off without warning” (134). In addition to
referring to “dangerous killers,” “murder,” and “outlaw regimes,” using the metaphor
“ticking timebombs” lends the situation gravity and a sense o f urgency. It also ties in with
his speculation that Saddam Hussein possesses weapons of mass destruction.
Furthermore, the implication is that terrorists = Arabs/Muslims. For example, he says,
“A terrorist underworld, including groups like Hamas, Hizballah, Islamic Jihad, Jaish-eMohammed, operates in remote jungles and deserts and hides in the centers o f large
cities” (1/29/2002, 135). All o f these groups hail from the Middle East. Unfortunately,
this reinforces Americans’ attitudes toward Arabs/Muslims in the aftermath o f September
11. According to the New York Times, hate crimes against Arab-Americans and MuslimAmericans increased dramatically immediately after 9/11. “From Sept. 11, 2001, to Feb.
14, the F B I. said it opened 414 hate crime investigations involving attacks or threats
against Arab-American targets, [...]. Among the crimes were murders, attempted
murders and assaults and arson attacks against mosques and Arab-American owned
businesses” (“F.B.I. Warns” A16).
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As Bush pinpoints the “Axis o f Evil” in his 2002 State o f the Union address, he states
that Iraq supports terrorism, and that they are developing anthrax (135). The significance
o f this, in light o f the events involving anthrax-laced letters that took place in the United
States following 9/11*, is that Bush seems to be suggesting that Saddam Hussein may be
responsible. This not only demonizes him, it makes Americans angry and fearful and
therefore more willing to support Bush’s Iraq initiative.
He ends his “Axis o f Evil” speech by polarizing US and THEM: “Our enemies send
other people’s children on missions o f suicide and murder. They embrace tyranny and
death as a cause and a creed. We stand for a different choice, made long ago on the day
o f our founding. We affirm it again today. We choose freedom and the dignity o f every
life” (139). Additionally, by referring to “our founding,” he appeals to Americans’ sense
of patriotism.
Bush’s October 7, 2002, address to the nation is particularly salient as a vehicle for
demonizing Saddam Hussein, Iraq, and the terrorists. With many Americans questioning
the decision to go to war in Iraq, the speech is intended to make as strong a case as

* In the months following the September 11 terrorist attacks, letters contaminated with
anthrax were sent through the U.S. postal system to NBC News anchor Tom Brokaw,
Democratic Senator Tom Daschle, and Democratic Senator Patrick Leahy, among others.
According to the New York Times, “Since the anthrax attacks began, four people have
died from inhalation anthrax, including two Washington postal workers, and six others
have contracted the disease. At least seven people have contracted skin anthrax, a much
less serious form o f the illness that does not necessarily require hospitalization” (Shenon
A1+). Although there was much speculation as to who was responsible— including “an
organized terrorist group” (Johnston B 6)— the F.B .I. has yet to solve this case.

40

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

possible. In it, he is very forthright; after thanking those in the audience for their
attendance, he begins: “Tonight I want to take a few minutes to discuss a grave threat to
peace and America’s determination to lead the world in confronting that threat. The threat
comes from Iraq” (1716). He then uses such words as: “history of aggression,” “arsenal
of terror,” “murderous tyrant,” and “merciless namre o f its regime” (1716). The use of
such forceful language underscores the perceived threat of imminent danger.
In the same speech. Bush refers to Saddam Hussein as “a homicidal dictator who is
addicted to weapons of mass destruction” (1717). O f course, “homicidal” is a very
negative descriptor, but adding the word “addicted” implies— in the American lexicon— a
sense o f being out o f control. Tying a lack o f restraint to “weapons of mass destruction”
in a post-9/11 world undeniably plays on Americans’ fears. Furthermore, the phrase
“weapons o f mass destruction,” which is now almost exclusively associated with Iraq, is
used liberally throughout all o f Bush’s war on terror speeches, and has even become a
popular and oft-cited part o f the American lexicon, frequently referred to as “WMD.” In
his Cincinnati address. Bush spends a good deal o f time discussing weapons o f mass
destruction, often giving very specific and technical details. For example, he says, “Iraq
has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes and other equipment needed for
gas centrifuges, which are used to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons” (1718).
According to van Dijk, emphasizing irrelevant details is a form o f manipulation; in order
to “hinder understanding,” a speaker may use “more complex sentences and abstruse
words” (Discourse 366). Giving such detailed information also underscores the severity
o f the situation, and gives Bush more credibility and authority.
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Much o f Bush’s demonizing is used to justify going to war in Iraq. In his attempts to
link Saddam Hussein and Iraq with Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups, he uses specific
examples and numbers to strengthen his argument. For example, he says, “Over the
years, Iraq has provided safe haven to terrorists such as Abu Nidal, whose terrorist
organization carried out more than 90 terrorist attacks in 20 countries that killed or
injured nearly 900 people, including 12 Americans. Iraq has also provided safe haven to
Abu Abbas, who was responsible for seizing the Achille Lauro and killing an American
passenger” (10/7/2002, 1717). Further into that speech. Bush invokes the memory of
another dictator: “The dictator o f Iraq is a student of Stalin, using murder as a tool o f
terror and control, [...]. On Saddam Hussein’s orders, opponents have been decapitated,
wives and mothers o f political opponents have been systematically raped as a method o f
intimidation, and political prisoners have been forced to watch their own children being
tortured” (1720). Comparing Saddam Hussein with Communist dictator Joseph Stalin is
perhaps meant to stir up images o f the Cold War, when Americans were so fearful o f the
enemy they rushed to build bomb shelters in their homes. In addition, talk of
decapitation, rape, and torture bring to mind shuttering images o f unspeakable acts that
surely resound with most Americans.
Finally, Bush utilizes what van Dijk refers to as “populism” to create a sense that
everyone agrees or supports his ideas regarding Saddam Hussein. In his Cincinnati
speech, for instance, he says, “Members o f Congress o f both political parties and
members o f the United Nations Security Council agree that Saddam Hussein is a threat to
peace and must disarm. We agree that the Iraqi dictator must not be permitted to threaten
America and the world with horrible poisons and diseases and gases and atomic weapons.
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Since we all agree on this goal, the issue is: How can we best achieve it?” (1716). Later
in the same speech, he asks, “If we know Saddam Hussein has dangerous weapons
today— and we do— does it make any sense for the world to wait to confront him as he
grows even stronger and develops even more dangerous weapons?” (1717). Because o f
the way these questions are presented, it appears as if the only logical approach is to go
after Saddam Hussein.
Marginalization o f the Other
In his speeches. Bush often makes comments about or refers to Arabs/Muslims,
particularly Iraqis, in ways that depict them as helpless and incapable o f determining their
own destiny. This is especially relevant to Said’s theory o f Orientalism and the premise
o f postcolonial theory. In the 2003 preface to Orientalism, Said writes.
What our leaders and their intellectual lackeys seem incapable of
understanding is that history cannot be swept clean like a blackboard,
clean so that “we” might inscribe our own future there and impose our
own forms of life for these lesser people to follow. It is quite common to
hear high officials in Washington and elsewhere speak o f changing the
map o f the Middle East, as if ancient societies and myriad peoples can be
shaken up like so many peanuts in ajar, (xviii)
As a consequence of these characterizations, the United States is often portrayed as
“savior” or “gatekeeper.” The innuendo is that we must come to their— the Other—
rescue. For example, in referring to what the United States has accomplished in
Afghanistan, Bush declares, “In 4 short months, our Nation has [...] saved a people from
starvation, and freed a country from brutal oppression” (1/29/2002, 134). In another
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speech he says, “We continue to help the Afghan people lay roads, restore hospitals, and
educate all o f their children” (5/1/2003, 517). In both o f these statements, the implication
is that the Afghan people are completely helpless; they are, in essence, reduced to an
imbecilic or childlike status.
America is often presented as the dominant force, and one that must fight not only for
itself, but also the world. For example: “Our Nation will continue to be steadfast and
patient and persistent in the pursuit o f two great objectives. First, we will shut down
terrorist camps, disrupt terrorist plans, and bring terrorists to justice. And second, we
must prevent the terrorists and regimes who seek chemical, biological, or nuclear
weapons from threatening the United States and the world” (1/29/2002, 134). In other
words, WE MUST SAVE THE WORLD! In addition, he emphasizes the strength o f the
United States over other nations: “My hope is that all nations will heed our call and
eliminate the terrorist parasites who threaten their countries and our own. [...] But some
governments will be timid in the face o f terror. And make no mistake about it: If they do
not act, America will” (1/29/2002, 135).
In his September 7, 2003, speech. Bush justifies the lack o f progress in Iraq by
referring to World War II, in which the U.S. was ultimately successful:
America has done this kind of work before. Following W orld War II, we
lifted up the defeated nations o f Japan and Germany, and stood with them
as they built representative governments. We committed years and
resources to this cause. And that effort has been repaid many times over in
the three generations o f friendship and peace. America today accepts the
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challenge o f helping Iraq in the same spirit— for their sake, and our own.
(1164).
O f course, today both Japan and Germany symbolize modem capitalistic societies, much
like the United States. Additionally, by stating that America “accepts the challenge,”
Bush fosters that sense o f solidarity.
In his 2002 State o f the Union address. Bush asserts, “And we have a great
opportunity during this time of war to lead the world toward the values that will bring
lasting peace” (138). The implication here is our values, which are perceived as better
than those o f the Other. In the ‘End o f Combat’ speech, values are again highlighted:
“We are committed to freedom in Afghanistan, in Iraq, and in a peaceful Palestine. The
advance o f freedom is the surest strategy to undermine the appeal o f terror in the world.
Where freedom takes hold, hatred gives way to hope. When freedom takes hold, men and
women turn to the peaceful pursuit o f a better life. American values and American
interests lead in the same direction: We stand for human liberty” (517). The sense of
moral superiority in these statements is palpable, and serves to further polarize US and
THEM.
Additionally, Bush is often condescending when referring to Iraqis. For example,
“We are encouraging the orderly transfer o f sovereignty and authority to the Iraqi
people” (9/7/2003, 1165) (emphasis added). Also, “Iraq is ready to take the next steps
toward self-government. [...]. From the outset, I have expressed confidence in the ability
o f the Iraqi people to govern themselves. Now they must rise to the responsibilities o f a
free people and secure the blessings o f their own liberty” (9/7/2003, 1165). Like the
Afghan people in the earlier examples, the Iraqis are treated disparagingly; Bush’s
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rhetoric is arrogant and patronizing. The overt implication is that we are better than they
are, and with our help, perhaps they will be able to take care o f themselves. In addition,
the innuendo is that we are providing them with the basic necessities o f life: “Men and
women in every culture need liberty like they need food and water and air” (5/1/2003,
517).
Bush also often talks about what will come out o f the war— the “rebuilding” process.
For example, “We have difficult work to do in Iraq. W e’re bringing order to parts o f that
country that remain dangerous. [...] W e’re helping to rebuild Iraq, [...]” (5/1/2003, 517).
He also states: “In Iraq, we are helping the long suffering people o f that country to build a
decent and democratic society at the center o f the Middle East. Together we are
transforming a place of torture chambers and mass graves into a nation o f laws and free
institutions. This undertaking is difficult and costly— yet worthy o f our country, and
critical to our security” (9/7/2003, 1163). And, “This budget request will also support our
commitment to helping the Iraqi and Afghan people rebuild their own nations, after
decades o f oppression and mismanagement. [...] This effort is essential to the stability of
those nations, and therefore, to our own security” (9/7/2003, 1165). O f course, both Iraq
and Afghanistan will be “rebuilt” by our workers, with our money, and in the way we
want it to be built.
By marginalizing the Other— in this case, the Iraqi and Afghan people— Bush
completely negates their culture and way o f life. For example, he states, “And America
needs citizens to extend the compassion o f our country to every part o f the world. So we
will renew the promise of the Peaee Corps, [...], and ask it to join a new effort to
encourage development and education and opportunity in the Islamic world” (1/29/2002,
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138). “Development” and “opportunity” imply capitalistic— Western— endeavors. Once
again, Bush insinuates that all people desire the American way o f life:
America believes that all people are entitled to hope and human rights,
to the nonnegotiable demands o f human dignity. [...] America is a friend
to the people of Iraq. Our demands are directed only at the regime that
enslaves them and threatens us. When these demands are met, the first and
greatest benefit will come to Iraqi men, women, and children. [...] The
long captivity o f Iraq will end, and an era of new hope will begin.
[...] Freed from the weight o f oppression, Iraq’s people will be able to
share in the progress and prosperity of our time. If military action is
necessary, the United States and our allies will help the Iraqi people
rebuild their economy and create the institutions o f liberty in a unified Iraq
at peace with its neighbors. (10/7/2002, 1720)
In order for democracy to have any hope o f working in the Middle East,
Arabs/Muslims must be treated with the dignity and respect that Bush insists “all people
are entitled to.” While demonizing and marginalizing them may have helped earn the
support o f the American public, it is fueling tensions between East and West,
strengthening stereotypes, and frankly, resulting in more terrorism.
My analysis o f these four war on terror speeches reveals rhetoric that is constructed
through American idealism and exceptionalism, and that fosters an ideology of
dominance and inequality. In the next chapter, I will discuss the implications o f this, as
well as address the ethical concerns.
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CHAPTER 4

EVALUATION
As many critics o f the Iraq war have pointed out, it was necessary for the Bush
Administration to “sell” the idea o f invading Iraq to the American public as well as the
global community. After all, neither Osama bin Laden nor al Qaeda had any apparent ties
to Iraq or Saddam Hussein. In the months following the terrorist attacks, the
administration began dialectically framing this perceived threat from Iraq in terms of
good vs. evil in an effort to gamer the support it needed. In Hegemony or Survival, noted
political thinker Noam Chomsky discusses the “propaganda” campaign aimed at linking
Saddam Hussein and 9/11: “The campaign [...] was highly successful in shifting
attitudes. It soon drove American public opinion off the global spectmm and helped the
administration achieve electoral aims and establish Iraq as a proper test case for the
newly announced doctrine o f resort to force at will” (3). The results o f the massive public
relations campaign waged by the Bush Administration have had— and will continue to
have for some time to come— far-reaching effects. America’s future role in the global
community is in question as many argue that we have lost our legitimacy.
O f course, many factors played a role in the outcome of the campaign. In addition to
the general climate o f fear following the terrorist attacks, America’s views o f itself and
the outside world go far in explaining reactions to President George W. B ush’s war on
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terror rhetoric. In this chapter, I will briefly explicate what it means to be “American,”
and why anti-Americanism is so prevalent around the world. Additionally, I will discuss
the political, social, cultural, and ethical implications o f Bush’s war on terror speeches.

Americans and “Americanism”
According to many opinion makers and political pundits around the world, the Bush
Administration successfully “duped” the American public into supporting a case for war
in Iraq. But it is not quite as simple as framing an issue in a certain manner. Many factors
contribute to the American psyche, particularly in the aftermath o f the terrorist attacks.
When the two jetliners hit the twin towers o f the World Trade Center on September 11,
2001, America’s sense o f safety, o f exceptionalism, and even its tendency toward
insularity, were shattered along with the buildings.
It is not difficult to imagine the level o f fear most Americans felt in the wake o f 9/11.
Aside from the horrific events themselves, the cocoon in which America had been
historically ensconced was penetrated. In times of crisis, it is only natural to rely on a
figure o f authority for explanation and reassurance. When Bush spoke to the American
public in the days following the terrorist attacks, his strength and resolve were admirable.
He was the rock on which his captive audience could lean. It was not long, however,
before the Bush Administration began its campaign against Iraq and Saddam Hussein.
Soon, as Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke point out, “The American public was
barraged with a litany o f doomsday scenarios” (209). Douglas Kellner posits that the
“mass hysteria” created by the Bush Administration “render[ed] the population malleable
to manipulation” (Media Spectacle 11). Consequently, while much o f what was said in
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the war on terror speeches left many in the global audience as well as critics here at home
skeptical, a majority o f Americans were buying it. “Americans were more willing to
believe that Saddam possessed WMDs and that a connection existed between Saddam
and 9/11 and Saddam and Al Qaeda partially because they suffered from heightened
levels o f anxiety and fear o f terrorism in the period following 9/11,” argue University of
Southern California communication scholars Amelia Arsenault and Manuel Castells

(289y
Psychologist Eileen L. Zurbriggen suggests Americans’ inability to see through the
misinformation propagated by the Bush Administration corresponds to the inclination of
trauma victims to be “blind” to a perpetrator’s actions when the victim is dependent on
the perpetrator. In “Lies in a Time o f Threat: Betrayal Blindness and the 2004 U.S.
Presidential Election,” she writes:
In an era in which the United States is the sole global superpower, every
citizen o f this country [and, indeed, every living creature on the planet] is
affected by the policies and actions o f the U.S. president and is therefore
dependent on him, at least to some extent. [...] It would then become more
difficult for [them] to notice the administration’s deceptions and
fabrications at the time they are being uttered, or to remember them
clearly at a later date. (191)
In addition to the general tendency to respect the office o f the presidency, Americans
were deeply vulnerable in the aftermath o f the terrorist attacks and therefore easily
swayed. It can certainly be argued that the Bush Administration took advantage o f the
collective frame o f mind during this time. Benjamin R. Barber queries, “One might ask
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whether any terrorist can have spread fear more effectively than the American
government inadvertently has done as it dutifully passes on random threats against
unspecified targets and warns that further attacks are a virtual certainty” (Fear 25).
Another aspect o f the American persona, as outlined in chapter 3, is a sense of
exceptionalism. Barber writes, “From its founding, America regarded itself as unique and
hence exempt from the laws that otherwise govern the life and destiny o f other nations”
(Fear 47). Americans have historically presented themselves as distinct. Indeed, posits
Zbigniew Brzezinski, America possesses an “established inclination to see itself as the
model for everyone else, with American preponderance even increasing the country’s
sense o f its moral vocation” (II). Stephen Hartnett and Laura Stengrim agree: “[...]
many in the United States appear to think o f the United States as the world, as if the
United States were not one nation among many but a universally accepted model to
which the world must inevitably look for guidance” (283). As my analysis in chapter 3
reveals, the Bush Administration relied on America’s vision of itself as exceptional to
further its agenda regarding Iraq. According to Barber, “[Bush] has defined that war in
terms o f a vision o f exceptional American virtue and a countervision o f foreign
malevolence that may strike outsiders as self-righteous [...] but which is powerfully
motivating within the United States and which gives to his policies an uncompromising
militancy invulnerable to world public opinion” (Fear 39).
It is this pride and sense o f being unique that also creates a very strong nationalism
among Americans. Richard Crockatt writes.
What is not in doubt is the allegiance o f a majority o f Americans to certain
profoundly unifying symbols, attitudes, and values that can collectively be
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c?A\eà Americanism. There is no more eloquent expression o f this
sentiment, which is sufficiently potent and historically grounded to qualify
as an ideology, than the unity displayed by the American people’s reaction
to September 11. (37-38)
The idea o f being violated by the terrorists reinforced the notion o f coming together, of
being one nation. Crockatt posits, “America has always been by its natural composition a
multicultural society, but that very diversity has placed a premium on adherence to
symbols o f national unity and national distinctiveness” (15). For example, immigrants
have always been encouraged to discard their “old world” identities and become
completely American. This, in part, can explain why Americans are so receptive to the
rhetoric o f US vs. THEM.
Another characteristic that can be identified as uniquely American is the desire for
isolation. Although terrorist attacks occur more frequently in other parts o f the world, and
citizens around the world have become somewhat immune to the routine fear these
attacks can cause, Americans have been— until September 11, 2001— somewhat isolated
from this way o f life. America has a long tradition o f isolationism, o f being insular and
concerned primarily with domestic issues. O f course, the tendency toward isolationism is
due predominantly to the desire for security, but its stance toward the outside world—
particularly before globalization— has been perceived as one o f disinterest. This, in part,
has contributed to the animosity and anti-American sentiment so prevalent around the
world. As Crockatt points out, “To the extent that America is a world unto itself, by
virtue o f its size, geographical location, social diversity, and economic dynamism, it is
often insulated from the reactions that its activity in the world arouses” (8). Indeed, write
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Halper and Clarke, “Most Americans are today utterly unaware o f the skepticism with
which the United States is often viewed internationally, even in Britain” (237). This is
perhaps why Americans were so shocked by the events o f 9/11, and why we have only
recently begun to understand the extent o f anti-Americanism.
v^Mri-Americanism
The concept o f Americanism inspires both fascination and hatred among the world’s
population. According to Crockatt, “Anti-Americanism was both a cause and a
consequence of the terrorism o f September 11 and, as such, it is central to an
understanding of these events” (43). How the rest o f the world views America is often
paradoxical. On the one hand, there is awe and allure. Perceptions o f life in America are
based on idealized and/or fantastical depictions in the preponderance o f American film
and television that has invaded the globe. Many cultures around the world have adopted
American social and cultural standards, and citizens from all over the world emigrate to
the United States to realize their “American Dream.” Nevertheless, this has also fostered
resentment and even hatred as indigenous cultures slowly fade and are replaced by
“McWorld.” It can be argued, however, that this is part of a natural process. Crockatt
points out that, “[A]s the leading world power, the United States inevitably attracts
opposition. Anti-Americanism has grown in step with the rise of the United States to
world power. Like imperial nations o f the past, the United States wields disproportionate
power that is an object both of attraction and resentment” (46).
On the other hand, Ameriean foreign poliey and Ameriea’s politieal role in the global
eommunity are almost universally regarded as questionable at best, and more often than
not, as detrimental to the rest o f the world. Chomsky cites a Time magazine poll in which

53

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

“more than 80 percent o f respondents in Europe regarded the US as the greatest threat to
world peace” (41). Specifically, America’s involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
as well as other Middle Eastern affairs has spawned the intense hatred and extreme
behavior that resulted, among other events, in 9/11. According to Brzezinski, “There is
no escape from the historic reality that American involvement in the Middle East is
clearly the main reason why terrorism has been directed at America [...]” (30).
Nevertheless, the Bush Administration appears oblivious to this fact, and their refusal to
acknowledge it only intensifies the conflict. Bush spoke to America and the world the
evening o f September 11, 2001, about the evil that had occurred; however, writes Peter
Singer,
A different president might not [...] have jumped to the conclusion that
America was attacked because it is ‘the brightest beacon for freedom and
opportunity in the world.’ That statement ignored Ameriea’s role in global
politics, and especially in the Middle East. It therefore struck many people
in other countries as a painful example o f just how self-satisfied America
is. (143)
Concurrently, Brzezinski states, “The unwillingness to recognize a historical connection
between the rise o f anti-Ameriean terrorism and America’s involvement in the Middle
East makes the formulation of an effective strategic response to terrorism that much more
difficult” (31).
America is becoming increasingly isolated from the rest o f the world because o f the
way it is asserting its superpower status. William Finnegan writes, “The depths o f hatred
that the United States has inspired in some o f the world’s most oppressed comers may be
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ultimately unfathomable” (53). It is therefore imperative that America not only rethink its
policies abroad, but truly consider the effects o f its discourse and actions.

Discourse, Manipulation, and the War on Terror
The Bush Administration knew they had to build up the perceived threat from Iraq in
order to gamer support for a preemptive strike. With the help o f the media, Americans
were inundated with horrifying images o f terrorism. Halper and Clarke write, “Fear of
terrorism provided the necessary glue to meld otherwise uncorroborated statements,
assumptions, predictions, and ideas into a case for war. Official discourse tumed the
assessment o f a hypothetical danger into the absolute proof o f a real danger” (209).
Amerieans began to believe the rhetoric. According to Teun van Dijk, manipulation,
which is a vital aspect o f critical discourse analysis, is inherently linked to power abuse.
He writes:
[T]he general goals o f manipulative discourse are the control o f the shared
social representations o f groups o f people beeause these social beliefs in
tum control what people do and say in many situations and over a
relatively long period. Once people’s attitudes are influenced, for instance
on terrorism, little or no further manipulation attempts may be necessary
in order for people to act according to these attitudes, for instance to vote
in favor o f anti-terrorism policies” (Discourse 369).
In other words, once the seed has been planted, beliefs and perceptions become rooted.
According to Arsenault and Castells, “framing research suggests that after frequent
exposure to pro-war coverage, subjects would be less likely to incorporate corrective
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information that threatened to disrupt the dominant news and political frame that the Iraq
W ar was justified” (291). As Zurbriggen suggests, Americans became “blind” to the
truth.
In March 2004, approximately one year after the attack on Iraq, the U.S. House of
Representatives Committee on Government Reform released a report, also known as the
Waxman Report, entitled, “Iraq on the Record: The Bush Administration’s Public
Statements on Iraq.” This report examines the public statements— from speeches,
television appearances, press conferences, and other interviews— made by the Bush
Administration (President George Bush, Vice President Richard Cheney, Defense
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary o f State Colin Powell, and National Security
Advisor Condoleezza Rice) regarding Iraq. According to the report, “ [T]he five officials
made misleading statements about the threat posed by Iraq in 125 public appearances.
The report and an accompanying database identify 237 specific misleading statements by
the five officials” (i). As the report points out, “The President and his senior advisors
have a special obligation to describe accurately the national security threats facing the
nation. [...] Members of Congress and the public see only a partial picture based on the
information the President and his advisors decide to release” (1). This rather telling
statement exemplifies the power o f dominant discourse and power abuse.
The report specifies what each member o f the Bush Administration said in discourse
leading up to the war in Iraq. For example, “President Bush made 55 misleading
statements about the threat posed by Iraq in 27 separate public statements or appearances.
[...] O f the 55 misleading statements [...], 4 claimed that Iraq posed an urgent threat; 14
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exaggerated Iraq’s efforts to develop nuclear weapons; 18 overstated Iraq’s chemical or
biological weapons capacity; and 19 misrepresented Iraq’s links to al Qaeda” (25).
Many o f the statements to which the report refers come from the four speeches
analyzed in this study. The report specifically cites Bush’s October 7, 2002, Cincinnati
speech: “In this speech. President Bush made 11 misleading statements about Iraq, the
highest number of misleading statements in any single appearance by any o f the five
officials. In this single appearance. President Bush made misleading statements about
Iraq’s nuclear capabilities, Iraq’s efforts to procure aluminum tubes, Iraq’s chemical and
biological capabilities, and Iraq’s connection to al Qaeda” (26). O f course, this speech
took place just prior to the congressional vote to authorize force in Iraq. Although
members o f Congress are generally thought to be part o f the elite, in this case they were a
part of the audience being manipulated.
Not only are Bush’s statements misleading and unethical, they undercut the trust that
is placed in our elected officials. Kellner posits, “As the history o f recent totalitarian
regimes demonstrates, systematic deception and lying rots the very fabric o f a political
society, and if U.S. democracy is to find new life and a vigorous future there must be
public commitments to truth and public rejection o f the politics o f lying” (16).

Implications
Because the United States is the w orld’s only superpower, the social, cultural, and
political implications o f the Bush Administration’s war rhetoric are extensive, and each
bears its own ethical concerns. In addition to the misinformation and lies, the four
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speeches analyzed in this study demonstrate a lack o f understanding or, worse, concern,
for political and ethnic differences.
In Bush’s war on terror speeches, he often refers to the societal benefits o f the war;
for example, how it will provide advantages to the Iraqi people by liberating them and
giving them opportunities previously unavailable. He insinuates that a community that
was tom apart by its leader— Saddam Hussein— will be rebuilt and be much more
cohesive. It has not played out that way. With the increase in violence in Iraq and the
threat of civil war, their sense o f community has been completely shattered. In addition,
because of the manner in which Iraq has been depicted domestically, most Americans
now associate it with “weapons o f mass destmction” (despite the fact that none were
found), terrorism, and extremism. Most o f the positive elements o f Iraqi life, like the
building o f schools and hospitals, and voting and elections, are associated with the
American presence. Once again, it gives the American public the impression that the
Iraqis need us.
Negative framing o f the Other has succeeded only in perpetuating stereotypes and
misunderstanding o f cultural and ethnic differences. This notion that we are a superior
and more civilized society only serves to polarize further America from the rest o f the
world. Moreover, the Bush Administration’s marginalization o f the Other has, in effect,
deprived them o f a voice. The Iraqi people (those not labeled “terrorists”), as revealed in
chapter 3, are portrayed as “incapable” and “weak.” This representation serves to justify
the Bush Administration’s actions in Iraq, but it is a portrait viewed through American
eyes; we refuse to acknowledge the existence o f other ideologies or modes o f living. In a
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true global community, all cultures must be equally represented and respected; difference
must not only be tolerated, but also celebrated.
From an ethical standpoint. Bush’s misleading statements about Iraq not only hurt the
Iraqis; he took advantage o f the American public when they were at their most
vulnerable, van Dijk argues that the focus o f manipulative discourse is on the societal and
ethical consequences, because “ [MJanipulation, socially speaking, is a discursive form of
elite power reproduction that is against the best interests of dominated groups and
[rejproduces social inequality” (Discourse 364). In essence, the effect is two-fold— by
manipulating the American public with misleading information. Bush maintains his
authority over his constituency, while subjugating the Other and therefore reinforcing
negative stereotypes.
The political effects of the rhetoric o f the war on terror are the most alarming, for
they can be the most catastrophic. The United States has effectively isolated itself from
the rest o f the world with its political hubris; even its allies are backing away. According
to Brzezinski, “Conduct that is perceived worldwide as arbitrary could prompt America’s
progressive isolation, undercutting not America’s power to defend itself as such, but
rather its ability to use that power to enlist others in a common effort to shape a more
secure international environment” (4). The misinformation and demonizing o f the Other
in the war on terror speeches have served only to increase terrorism. Chomsky posits that
the only link between Iraq and the threat of terror is that the invasion in Iraq has fueled
the terrorists and has led to an increase in Al Qaeda recruitment (19). What is more,
America’s insular and self-absorbed attitude may be its downfall. Brzezinski writes, “A
hegemony is a transient historical phase. Eventually, even if not soon, America’s global
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dominance will fade. It is therefore not too early for Americans to seek to determine the
shape o f their hegemony’s eventual legacy” (213).
By defying international law and acting unilaterally, Bush effectively negated the
power o f the United Nations. Some critics argue that his actions carry legal as well as
ethical ramifications. Peter Singer states, “Bush’s claim that the United Nations would be
irrelevant if it did not agree to the use o f force against Iraq showed that he had already
decided that it was irrelevant— that is, that if it did not go along with what he wanted, he
would ignore its decision. [...] In the end, it was Bush who made the United Nations
irrelevant in regard to Iraq” (192). What is o f particular concern is that Bush is setting a
precedent that may well affect future international disputes. Although the implicit
meaning in disregarding the authority o f the United Nations was that the United States, as
the sole superpower, could do whatever it wanted, other nations may be inclined to do the
same. Global chaos could ensue. As Singer points out:
Whether the danger posed by the combination of new weapons
technologies with radical religious and political ideas can be controlled at
all is something that only time will tell. In the long run, however, we are
more likely to succeed in meeting this threat by international cooperation
than by one nation acting unilaterally and in defiance o f international law.
American preeminence may well prove to be not only unjust, but a tragic
mistake with catastrophic consequences. (200)
Another ethical concern is Bush presenting false or misleading information in his war
on terror speeches. By justifying the attack on Iraq because Saddam Hussein possessed
weapons o f mass destruction, and linking him with al Qaeda and 9/11, Bush completely
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discredits him self as well as the United States. The complete and utter disregard for the
truth will surely have negative effects in the future. Furthermore, when it became clear
that Bush propagated misinformation, he refused to accept any blame or responsibility,
essentially brushing off any criticism. Singer writes;
A person o f good moral character who takes a false step will admit it, seek
to understand what went wrong, and try to prevent something similar from
happening again. When Bush’s use o f misleading intelligence about Iraq
was exposed, however, he blocked an open investigation into how he and
his staff came to mislead the American public and the world about the
basis on which he went to war. Instead, he made further inaccurate
statements about when the intelligence was first known to be
unsubstantiated and about the events that led to the decision to go to war.
(225)
America cannot “go it alone.” It is imperative that America realign itself with its
allies, and reestablish its leadership abilities. Moreover, if globalization is going to work,
an understanding and acceptance o f diversity— o f the Other— is imperative. As
Brzezinski so succinctly puts it, “With America [...] fated to be the catalyst either for a
global community or for global chaos, Americans have the unique historical
responsibility to determine which o f the two will come to pass. Our choice is between
dominating the world and leading it” (xi).
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CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION
As o f October 30, 2007, the U.S. death toll in Iraq stands at 3,842; the number of
wounded exceeds 28,000.^ Economically, the war in Iraq has thus far cost the United
States over $464 billion,'** and according to New York Times columnist David Leonhardt,
direct and indirect costs (for example, medical expenses for wounded veterans) could
exceed $1.2 trillion. A recent poll o f the Iraqi people found that a staggering 71% want
U.S. troops to withdraw; the vast majority o f them believe that the U.S. presence causes
more conflict than it prevents (Kull). Terrorist activity has increased around the globe as
U.S. actions have only strengthened the resolve o f such terrorist organizations as al
Qaeda and the Taliban. East and West are more sharply divided. The United States is
looked upon with skepticism and distrust by much o f the global community. These are
but a few examples of the outcome o f the Bush Administration’s war on terror.
The dominant discourse o f the war on terror may have served a purpose at one time,
but it was fleeting. While George W. Bush succeeded in persuading a majority o f
Americans to support a war in Iraq, ultimately he failed them. As Zbigniew Brzezinski
points out:

According to the “Iraq Coalition Casualty Count” at
<http ://icasualties.org/oif/default.aspx>
"* This figure is current as o f October 30, 2007, and can be found at
<http://nationalpriorities.org/Cost-of-War/Cost-of-War-3.html>
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The president must do more than stir the American people; he must also
educate them. The political education o f a large democracy cannot be
pursued by patriotic slogans, fear-mongering, or self-righteous arrogance.
Every politician faces that temptation, and it is politically rewarding to
yield to it. But harping on terrorism distorts the public’s vision o f the
world. It breeds the risk o f defensive self-isolation, fails to give the public
a realistic understanding o f the world’s complexities, and furthers the
fragmentation o f the nation’s strategic cohesion. (219-20)
As the holder o f the highest office in the United States, the president has an
overwhelming ability to influence public opinion. In this capacity, Bush is both morally
and ethically responsible for the manner in which he informs the public, for not only does
it affect our nation domestically, but with globalization the new reality, it affects
America’s role in the global community. In this study, I have endeavored to reveal the
effects o f dominant discourse and examine and contextualize America’s emerging role in
the global community by peering through a lens unclouded by Western assumptions and
biases. Although Bush may have said that America was attacked because it is the
“brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world,” in reality, America’s social,
cultural, and political influences and practices around the world played a major role. In
“The Real Axis o f Evil,” George Katsiaficas writes:
The absurdity and tragedy o f such a world is made even more absurd
and tragic by the profound ignorance and insensitivity o f the wealthiest
planetary citizens regarding the terrible plight o f human beings in the
periphery.
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In such a world, o f course, there can be no lasting peace. As long as the
wretched o f the earth, those at the margins of the world system, are
dehumanized, branded as terrorists, and kept out o f decision-making, they
have no alternative but to carry out insurrection and wage war in order to
find justice. (350)
It is therefore critical that we look beyond the suicide bombers and the terrorist training
camps and make a serious effort at understanding why terrorism exists.
Using postcolonial theory in the analysis o f dominant discourse is one such way to
recognize the nuances of what is being said, for, as Raka Shome and Radha Hegde
emphasize, “ [t]he politics of communication are o f central importance in the
understanding of the contradictions and ambivalence in our deeply divided world” (261).
In focusing on the fragile relationship between East and West, analyzing Bush’s war on
terror speeches from a postcolonial point o f view helped to expose subtle, implicit
statements o f racism— specifically, those that serve to demonize or marginalize the
Other. Furthermore, using critical discourse analysis as a method for analyzing Bush’s
war on terror speeches revealed how Bush attacked, discredited, and marginalized the
Iraqis in order to sway public opinion. As Shome and Hegde point out, “ [A] postcolonial
intervention pushes for more socially responsible problematizations o f communication. It
is these critiques that will lead eventually to the production o f a more just and equitable
knowledge base about the third world, the other, and the ‘rest’ o f the world” (261).
Despite the benefits o f this study, there are a number of limitations. For one,
“Americanism”— or, what it means to be “American”— is a complex and historical
ideology as well as a rhetorical construction that deserves far greater attention than it was
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given here. A more thorough undertaking o f this topic would greatly enhance our
understanding of the American public’s willingness to support the Bush Administration
in their bid to go after Saddam Hussein and Iraq. Additionally, although George W. Bush
delivered the four war on terror speeches analyzed in this study, many critics believe the
real architects behind the Bush Administration’s war on terror are Bush’s (now former)
senior political advisor Karl Rove and Vice President Richard Cheney. A more thorough
study might include the rhetoric o f all key players. Finally, I would like to point out that,
for the purposes o f this study, I focused on American ignorance and insensitivity toward
the Other— specifically, the Iraqis. However, I am fully aware that Americans, too, are
often misunderstood and stereotyped, and I therefore emphasize that all peoples and
cultures could benefit from a deeper understanding o f the other.
When I began this project, very little scholarship centered on the global implications
o f communication. Perhaps this study, and others like it, can begin to facilitate research
and scholarship with a more universalizing perspective. Once again, the salience of
studying dominant discourse within the context o f globalization must be emphasized, for
communication is one of the foundations o f globalization and the new global community.
Richard Crockatt writes, “[GJlobalization influences all aspects o f life— the economic,
political, social, and cultural— with the revolution in communications perhaps being the
single most important novel factor, since the increase in speed and volume o f information
underpins changes in all the other spheres” (115). Future research could focus more on
the role of communication in globalization, as well as the effects of new modes of
communication on the Other. Additionally, a more in-depth look at the interplay of

65

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

politics and communication could further our understanding o f dominant discourse and
power abuse.
It is vital that we attempt to understand the root o f the cause— why terrorists do what
they do— rather than simply demonizing and marginalizing them. Until causes of
terrorism are addressed, it seems unlikely that military action against terrorists alone can
solve the problem. The Bush doctrine is void o f diplomacy and is only creating more
global strife and tension, not to mention terrorism. It is my hope that this study, in
addition to providing insight into the importance o f understanding other cultures and
peoples, has furthered our understanding o f dominant discourse and power abuse, and
how they pertain to globalization and the global community.
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